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The close connection and subordination of traditional religions and churches with/to
some contemporary social-political projects, besides being a consequence of secularization, is
also one of the dimensions of globalization. As a process in which religious thought, practice,
and institutions tend to lose their social significance /B. Wilson/, secularization raises a
dilemma before traditional religions and churches: either modernize and become part of the
changing socio-cultural environment, or become marginal and remain but a remnant of the
past. According to the eminent sociologist of religion, Peter Berger, the subordination of
religion and the church to modernization would be tantamount to a kind of cultural suicide. If
religion were reduced to being a tool of the political, the ethnic, the existential, it would lose
its specific cultural features and mission. The latter could only be preserved through a
creative and selective attitude to the values of modernization. P. Beyer expects that two basic
trends in the process of inclusion of religion in the global world will be realized, especially in
Central and Eastern Europe. The first is related to the privatization of the religious, its
transformation into a private matter, an element of the formation of personal identity. The
other unfolding tendency is the politicization of religion and the churches, their linkage to
collective (national, ethnic) identities. In this process the nation, not religion, becomes the
fundamental value. Religion becomes a means, an instrument, and turns into a kind of civic
 Beyer, P. “Privatisation and Politicization of Religion in Global Society. Implications for1
Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe.” In Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern
Europe. Krakow, 1999, pp. 21-25.
 Berger, P. “Reflections on the Sociology of Religion Today.”  In Sociology of Religion, vol. 62,2
No. 4, 2001, pp. 425-429.
 Casanova, J. “Religion, the New Millennium and Globalization.” In Sociology of Religion, vol.3
62, No. 4, 2001, pp. 425-429.
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 4 (AUGUST 2004) page 2.
religion. The Church is left with a symbolic authority, while the real authority is shifted to the
state.1
Unfortunately the term “religion” is often employed without preliminary discussion
of the contents of religiousness and without the necessary distinction between it and its social
uses as a motivation, emblem, and an emotional mobilizing factor in conflict situations, as a
form of secondary and arbitrary sacralization of various associations and human activities. In
such cases the external and formal marks of the religious, such as affiliation, delimitation
from others, identification with a territory and community, are put to functional use; the
contents of religion that once determined its origin, such as adhering to a certain ethos and
observing a specific moral code  (particularly characteristic of Christianity) remain in the
background.
The secularization paradigm, which was basic in the scientific approach to religion
during most of the 20  century, is undergoing serious revision today, in the time ofth
globalization.  Peter Berger considers it not a paradigmatic characteristic, but as one of the
cultural dimension of contemporary religion.  The processes involving decrease of the2
unifying force of the nation-state, the revival of local forms of identity and sociality (ethnic,
religious, cultural communities), of regional and trans-national alliances, have served to
animate religious feelings and have redefined the cultural borderlines of religion. Some of the
phenomena that demonstrate most convincingly the return of religion to the global public
scene are: 1) the trans-national spiritual and institutional “networks,” created by traditional
religions and churches--especially the Catholic Church; 2) the increasing inclusion of
religious affiliation among the constituting and unifying symbols of ethnic and cultural
communities and identities; 3) the appearance of religious movements and associations not
committed to any religious tradition, any nation or ethnic group, but often representing a kind
of synthesis, a bricolage of various religious ideas and practices.3
This specific property of religion to serve as an emblem of trans-national unities, as
well as its universalistic spiritual dimension, are actively utilized in the formulation of
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paradigms of the “new world order”. Politicians, humanitarians, religious leaders have
repeatedly stated  that Christianity is the value and spiritual emblem of a united Europe. A
proposition coming from Poland would have the belief in God be included in the text of the
Constitution of United Europe as a uniting value for Europeans. Even as large-scale a cultural
genre as the philosophy of history has also been resorting to the uniting/dividing potential of
religion and has defined the new borderlines between civilizations on the basis of religious
divisions (S. Huntington, some Russian religious philosophers, both past and contemporary).
Different Religions, Similar Changes
I see this tendency as reflecting the essence of the much debated process (notion) of
secularization. Understood in this way, secularization is a tendency evident even in Islamic
countries, where religion is increasingly connected with political, national, social projects and
interests. It is a known fact that in Modern times politics, law, and the state have gradually
taken over the educational, moral, protective functions of the Church and of religion.
Although carried out by different means and in various forms, this process is evident
throughout the 20  century in almost all countries with a predominantly Christian population.th
Sociological surveys in the 20  century have stressed the similarity in the tendencies in mostth
of these countries  in the following respects: 1) a decreasing number of religious believers; 2)
a decreasing number of participants in religious rituals; 3) an increasingly personal,
individual vision of God, etc. We may conclude that, as far as the social and cultural status of
the separate confessions of Christianity are concerned, all three divisions have been
undergoing similar changes. Various researchers have shown that the declared level of
religiousness and the degree of participation in Church rituals are higher in proportion to the
degree to which religion serves as an integrating factor for the community. Here the
transcendent entity of which the individual becomes a part is the group, and therefore religion
becomes mostly a form of “belonging to a group.”
The Orthodox Religion and the “Orthodox Civilization”
Many Orthodox religious philosophers, especially the Russians of the late 19  andth
early 20  centuries (Berdyaev, Solovyov, Florenski, etc.) relate Orthodoxy and Orthodoxth
culture to a kind of spirituality, emotionality, community feeling in which moral values are
prevalent, thus placing Orthodoxy in opposition to the predominantly utilitarian values of
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Western Christian culture. This line of thinking often leads these authors to distinguishing an
Orthodox cultural zone (civilization) as a separate cultural-historical entity. According to
many of these thinkers, Orthodoxy is spiritually superior to Western Christian civilization
and has better prospects for the future. While some of these observations are true and
perceptive, the conclusions of such religious-philosophical ideas often serve to justify the
century-long rivalry between the two parts of the Christian culture. This type of thinking has
the quality of inertia in making of Orthodoxy a distinguishing trait, an emblem of a
comparatively homogenous, closed cultural and social system, radically different from the
Western Christian one. This attitude is often expressed in the formula “either-or”. O.
Spengler a century ago and S. Huntington recently have reanimated a more modern version
of this kind of mythology. Intermediate in time was A. Toynbee, who defined the two
branches of Christianity as “sister civilizations”. But there are many arguments against that
form of cultural division: 1) Although they have many common socio-cultural features, the
separate countries of so-called Orthodox civilization have important economic, political, and
cultural differences, which led to the formation of their separate national states in the 19  andth
20  cent.; 2) their common Orthodox creed not only failed to harmonize relations betweenth
these states, but became a spiritual and ideological cause for rivalry during the centuries; at
various times Bulgaria, Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Romania have competed for leadership as
the center of Orthodox statehood; 3) the close link between Orthodoxy and the national
statehood in all Orthodox countries was destroyed at the time of the totalitarian regimes
(except in Greece) and Orthodoxy lost much of its social support; 4) the revival of Orthodox
religiousness after the fall of the totalitarian regimes is a rather complex phenomenon, and to
all appearances it will follow some of the basic tendencies in contemporary religiousness in
Western countries, i.e. the individualization of faith, religious pluralism, implicit religion, the
phenomena of “believing without belonging” and “belonging without believing.”
Of course, there are many features common to the countries of the so-called
Orthodox civilization, characteristics related to the economic, political, cultural specifics and
traditions, whose historical origin can be analyzed concretely. For instance there are many
spiritual and moral features ascribed to Orthodoxy that are due rather to national mentality, to
the paternalistic communitarian traditions, which Orthodoxy has adapted to rather than
initiated. In other cases a process of interaction and interweaving of factors has taken place,
in which it is hard to distinguish cause and effect, essence and form. Many researchers point
 Tomka, M. “Tendances de la religiosité et de l’orientation vers les Eglises en Europe de l’Est.”4
In Social Compass, vol. 49, N4, 2002, pp. 540, 544-545, 547.
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out the existence of a strong pagan cultural substratum behind the refined facade of the
Orthodox doctrine; medieval heretical movements have also restricted the social and spiritual
space of official Orthodoxy. But, as we know, similar processes have taken place in Western
Christianity as well.
The Religious “ Revival” in the Post-Communist Countries
In every one of the post-communist countries, immediately after the start of the
democratic changes there was a rapid process of stratification and division of society based
on material, political, ethnic, cultural-religious, etc., status. The traditional confessions and
Churches, especially in countries with a single predominant confession, proved to be
potential and actual bearers of a kind of unifying, consolidating spiritual and institutional
resource. In the post-totalitarian period, the presidential institution, seeking a stabilizing,
unifying foundation for society amidst pluralism and strife, and concerned by the instability
of state power, was particularly prone to resort to the Church: by definition the traditional
religion personified the much needed social fundament.
In face of the social demand for a unifying resource, not all national Churches were
capable of assuming such a role. Besides traditional cultural-historical authority rooted in the
remote past, national Churches needed to have also won moral authority by their behavior
during the totalitarian regime.
The conclusion that a “revival” of religiousness is taking place in most post-
communist countries has often been argued on the basis of sociological inquiries, carried out
regularly since 1990. Immediately after the start of democratic changes, a quick growth in the
number of religious believers was registered in these studies, together with a growing interest
in the Church and hopes about its social role. According to the findings of the large-scale
European Values Study of 1999,  the religious identification in the period 1990-1999 does4
indeed display an upward trend in Russia, Latvia, Bulgaria, and, to a lesser degree, in
Hungary and Czech Republic, but also a downward trend in Slovenia and the Eastern part of
Germany. A comparison with corresponding trends of change in other European countries
shows that post-communist countries are not in a particular, exceptional situation. For
instance some growth in religious identification for this period can also be observed in Italy
 Tomka, M. “Tendances de la religiosité…”, p. 547.5
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and Sweden, while in Great Britain, Spain, Austria, France, and the Western part of Germany
there is a more or less perceptible decrease in this respect. The post-communist countries
include countries with some of the highest degrees of religiousness in Europe (Poland,
Romania, Croatia) as well as some of the lowest values for this parameter (Slovenia and
Czech Republic). There are certain differences between post-communist and other European
countries with regard to expectations and hopes regarding the social and cultural role of the
Church. The highest shares of respondents in Romania (74.7%), Lithuania (74.4%), the
Ukraine (63.1%), and Poland (62.7%) feel that the Church can contribute significantly to
solving the moral, family, spiritual, and social problems of society. Among the most skeptical
about the role of the Church in solving these problems are: the Eastern part of Germany
(27.6%), Bulgaria (33.9%), Czech Republic (36.4%), Estonia (38.5%). In the middle range of
the scale are Hungary (42.3%), Belarus (44.5%), Slovenia (46.8%), Latvia (52.8%), Russia
(55.1%), Slovakia (59.7%), and Croatia (60%).
The decade since the beginning of democratic changes has been marked in most
countries by the loss of trust, by crisis and concussion in the changing institutions and spheres
that are the support of collective and individual identities, i.e. the state, the school system, the
judiciary, culture, the armed forces. This was one more cause for the trend of rechanneling
the need for security and stability of the individual and society toward religion and the
Church, a traditional institution less liable to abrupt changes and shocks. Hence arose higher
trust in the Church (compared with other institutions) in most post-communist countries than
in most West European ones. The citizens of Austria, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland,
Belgium, Spain, Denmark indicate smaller degrees of trust in their respective Churches than
in other public institutions, as evidenced by the European Values Study of 1999.  According5
to the data of that survey, in most post-communist countries (with the exception of Estonia,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and the Eastern part of Germany), people place greater
trust in the Church than in other institutions. This difference is particularly perceptible in
Romania, the Ukraine, Croatia, Slovakia, and Russia.
Of course, comprised in the sum total of people with increased religiousness, there is
a percentage of people for whom the change in religious behavior stems from a deep personal
change, from spiritual growth, and is closely connected with a specific religious experience of
 Tomka, M . “Religion, Church, State and Civil Society in East-Central Europe.” In Church-State6
Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow, 1999, p. 45.
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the sacred. But such change and growth, which arrange the entire life world of a person
around God and the sacred, are usually slow and painful; they are accessible to only a few.
This is what studies of religiousness in Western countries have shown. When mass public
changes and trends in the religious sphere are considered--changes that have occurred in a
comparatively brief period of time (from a few months to several years), serious analysis and
argumentation is necessary before such phenomena can be defined as specifically religious.
This line of reasoning is supported by findings of sociological surveys on religiousness in the
post-communist countries. A survey carried out in the spring of 1998  shows that the6
percentage of “deeply” religious or “definitely” religious respondents represents a relatively
small share of the total number of people defining themselves as religious. The percentage is
smallest in Germany (2.1%), in the Ukraine (3.8%), in Slovenia (5.1%); it is largest in
Croatia (33.3%), in Hungary (22.6%), and in Poland (19.5%). With its 12% of “deeply
religious” respondents, registered in a 1994 study,  Bulgaria is situated around the middle of7
the scale, together with Romania and Slovakia. Most of the people who identify themselves
as religious place themselves in the categories marked by hesitation and vagueness: “religious
to a certain degree,” “neither religious, nor non-religious,” “somewhat non-religious.” In
Lithuania this category amounts to 89.1%, in Slovenia to 83.3%, in Romania 81.6%, in
Poland 77%. Past studies that were detailed enough to permit substantial analysis of this type
of “hesitant” faith have usually registered the respondents’ lack of knowledge of religious
doctrine, their acceptance of only part of the religious fundamentals, lack of interest in or
consistent observance of church rituals, lack of correspondence between religious convictions
and daily behavior, etc. The highest degrees of such characteristics have been registered in
Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Hungary . Actually these trends8
are typical for most West European countries; scholars have pointed out as their major causes
the individualization of faith, freedom of belief, the breakup of collective identities supported
by traditional religions, etc.
 Ibid., p. 41.9
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The cited data do not provide sufficient grounds for any categorical division between
European countries as regards the processes and trends in religions and churches. Together
with this, there are differences within the group itself of the post-communist countries,
distinctions that can hardly be accounted for by purely religious or confessional factors. For
instance, both the highest and lowest degrees of religiousness have been registered among
some Catholic and some Orthodox countries. The same is true for the levels of trust in
Churches. The highest degrees of trust has been registered in Catholic Croatia and in
Orthodox Romania, while the lowest have been indicated in Catholic Slovenia and Czech
Republic, and in Orthodox Bulgaria. These facts cast doubt on the veracity of analyses that
draw dividing lines based on the observed religious changes between countries with a
developed democracy as opposed to post-communist countries, secularized vs. de-secularized
cultures, Orthodox vs. Catholic countries, etc.
Religious-Political Synthesis
Preserving the monopoly of a predominant religious confession over other, minority
religions in a country represents an important line of interaction between religion and politics
in post-communist countries. The more strongly the ethnic-politic project of the predominant
ethnos is connected with that group’s religious predominance, the more effective and
excluding for minority religions is the interaction between religion and politics.  Although
religious intolerance is considered typical mostly for Orthodox countries , it is also9
characteristic of Catholicism in those countries where religion has become interwoven with
the nation-state, e.g. Poland and Croatia. In all these countries the traditional churches require
state political support in order to preserve and enhance their social positions and restrict the
competition of the new religious movements. The latter represent a growing challenge to the
conservative aspects of traditional religions: the new movements offer more modern religious
ideas and practices, and a more emotional and attractive form of communication. Although in
constitutional and legal terms the freedom of religious belief and religious communities has
been declared in post-communist countries, in fact in most of them the religions of the
minorities and the new religious movements are in a disadvantaged position. A more
 White, S., I. McAllister.” Orthodoxy and Political Behavior in Postcommunist Russia.” In10
Review of Religious Research, vol. 41, No. 3, 2000, p. 362.
 Ibid., p.370.11
 Zweerde, E. “Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity…”, p. 37.12
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complicated procedure for registration and performing activities has been established for
them than for the traditional confessions.
In the countries where, for various reasons (mostly rooted in the distant or recent past
of their traditional confessions) religion and the church have failed to become a consolidating
social force, they are not attracting strong public interest and trust. Such is the position in the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In Bulgaria the line of cleavage in society
since the start of reforms was not ethnic-based but political, hence religious differences
(especially between Orthodoxy and Islam) never became a basis for mutual aggression and
contention. The prevalence of political strife over religious-ethnic differences is evident in the
political divisions within the Orthodox community itself: the formation and opposition
between the two synods of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church reflected and resulted from the
political-party division within society at large.
Historically the bearer of strong pan-Orthodox and imperial traditions, after the social
changes the Russian Orthodox Church proved to be a suitable support for the presidential
institution and a reviver of the worn-out foundations of “Russian” consciousness and self-
esteem. Unlike the case of most other post-communist countries, where the increase of
religiousness was usually among the older population, in Russia (1991 - 57%, 1996 - 75%)
religious feelings extended to a large share of young and educated people.  Although it has10
no serious impact on the electoral or political behavior of the faithful, affiliation with
Orthodoxy is often an indicator of the prevalent authoritarian political preferences.11
Analyzing the social-political dimensions of contemporary Russian religiousness, the
sociologist of religion E. Zweerde points out that the growing interest in religion is largely
due to the desire for a more egalitarian, less fragmented society that seeks a basis for
consolidation in religion.  We are drawn to the same conclusion when analyzing the12
religious attitudes of some believers, attitudes marked by hesitation, vague expectations,
ignorance of and failure to practice some fundamental elements of the doctrinal and ritual
aspect of Orthodoxy.
The expectations that Russian Orthodoxy will play a consolidating role for society
and the lack of an equally influential rival religion preclude the modern functioning of
 Elliot, M., S. Corrado. “ The 1997 Russian Law on Religion the Impact on Protestants.” In13
Religion, State and Society, vol. 27, No. 1, 1999
 Borowik, I. “Religion and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Paradoxes of14
Transformations.” in Church-State Relations… , p. 17.
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religion in the structuring of Russian political space. The formation on a voluntary basis of
various religious communities and their equal footing in the activities of civil society is part
of the modern liberal-democratic project. Russian society, particularly the state and the
political sphere in Russia, are still conservative and restrictive in their attitudes to religious
variety, to the religious “market” in the country (the new Law on Religion demonstrates
this).  This is still a mono-religious society,  insensitive and intolerant to religious variety13
and, consequently, is still unprepared to become part of the global civil society.
The Churches in post-communist countries need the support of the state and
legislature and are dependent on the state as regards two other important issues: the
restoration of ecclesiastic property rights and the introduction of religious teaching in school.
The teaching of religion in school has been introduced in some countries (Poland, Romania,
Croatia), although it has met with mixed reactions and reservation on the part of public
opinion. In other countries (the Ukraine, Belarus, Slovenia), in harmony with the prevalent
attitudes, a general discipline “religious studies” or “religion” has been introduced as an
optional discipline;  the situation in Bulgaria is similar.14
These complicated and contradictory tendencies in the relationship between church
and the secular sphere of government and politics, provoke ambivalent public valuations and
hopes concerning religious “revival.” Feelings range from excessive expectations and
entrusting religion with important social functions, to accusations of loss of religious ideals--
more specifically, that religion remains enclosed in conservative clericalism instead of
performing its mission of spiritual and moral consolidation of society. On the other hand, in
some extreme forms of the synthesis between religion and ethnos or religion and politics,
religion seems to play a role that is alien to it, but which is assigned to it due to the weakness
and immaturity of other social subjects and institutions such as the state, political parties,
secular ideologies, civil society. The development and modernization of the latter will
probably place religions and the Churches in their specific place, that of forms of spirituality
and social communion which, in their various social activities, are guided by their own
specific motivation and ethos.
